A note on charitable giving by corporates and aristocrats: evidence from a field experiment by Bassi, Vittorio et al.
www.ssoar.info
A note on charitable giving by corporates and
aristocrats: evidence from a field experiment
Bassi, Vittorio; Huck, Steffen; Rasul, Imran
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bassi, V., Huck, S., & Rasul, I. (2016). A note on charitable giving by corporates and aristocrats: evidence from a
field experiment. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt
Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2016-304). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung gGmbH. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130711
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Bassi, Vittorio; Huck, Steffen; Rasul, Imran
Working Paper
A note on charitable giving by corporates and
aristocrats: Evidence from a field experiment
WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-304
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Bassi, Vittorio; Huck, Steffen; Rasul, Imran (2016) : A note on charitable
giving by corporates and aristocrats: Evidence from a field experiment, WZB Discussion Paper,
No. SP II 2016-304, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130711
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
  
 
Research Area 
Markets and Choice 
Research Unit 
Economics of Change 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
    
Vittorio Bassi 
Steffen Huck 
Imran Rasul 
 
A note on charitable giving by 
corporates and aristocrats:  
Evidence from a field experiment 
 
Discussion Paper 
SP II 2016–304 
April 2016 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH 
Reichpietschufer 50 
10785 Berlin 
Germany 
www.wzb.eu 
  
 
 
Affiliation of the authors: 
 
Vittorio Bassi, University College London (vittorio.bassi.09@ucl.ac.uk) 
 
Steffen Huck, WZB and University College London (steffen.huck@wzb.eu) 
 
Imran Rasul, University College London (i.rasul@ucl.ac.uk) 
Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work 
in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and aca-
demic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not con-
stitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The 
discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective 
author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. 
Copyright remains with the authors. 
  
Abstract 
A note on charitable giving by corporates and aristocrats:  
Evidence from a field experiment* 
 
 
Multiple sources of funding are becoming increasingly important for charitable 
organizations. Donations from corporate donors for example account for 25-35% 
of charitable income for the largest US charities, across charitable sectors. This 
note presents some tentative first evidence from a natural field experiment to 
shed light on how different types of potential donors: individuals, corporates and 
aristocratically titled individuals, respond to the same fundraising drive. Each 
donor type was randomly assigned to treatments varying in two dimensions: (i) 
whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead 
donor; (ii) how individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead 
donor. We find that aristocrats are significantly more likely to respond and that 
corporates give significantly more than individuals. Treatment effects moreover 
suggest that (proportional) matching is to be avoided for corporate donors. 
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experiment. 
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1 Introduction
Many social commentators today suggest that a second great age of philanthropy is upon us. Some
of the world’s wealthiest individuals, such as Bill Gates and George Soros, contribute vast sums
to good causes, mimicking the philanthropic behavior of the Carnegies, Mellons and Rockefellers
of the nineteenth century. Such trends are of course not con…ned to America—for example the
Scottish entrepreneur Sir Tom Hunter announced in 2007 his intention to redirect over £1bn of his
personal fortune into charitable projects worldwide. At the same time, similar initiatives towards
good causes are now well established among corporate donors. Two well known charitable drives
led by corporates are the Livestrong and Red campaigns. The Livestrong campaign, a partnership
between Nike and the Lance Armstrong Foundation and Endowment, raised over $50 million in
2009, with $5 million coming from merchandise sales including the famous yellow wristbands.
Since its inception in 2006, Product Red campaign has raised over $150 million for the Global
Fund to help eliminate AIDS in Africa through events and the sale of Red products by corporations
such as Gap and Apple.
Despite vast sums being given by philanthropic and corporate donors, the bulk of the economics
literature on charitable giving has focused on the determinants of why and how individuals give.1
Far less attention has been given to the charitable behavior of other donor types, such as corporates
or aristocrats—namely those with some formal title such as Earl or Baron and who might therefore
be from a family dynasty with a history of philanthropy. This paper presents evidence from a
large-scale natural …eld experiment designed to shed light on how corporates, aristocrats, and
individuals, di¤er in their response to the same fundraising scheme. We provide some …rst tentative
evidence to help understand whether and how each recipient type responds to commonly used
methods in fundraising, such as the presence of lead donors and donations being matched at some
rate. In doing so, we address new questions of how charitable organizations might design and
target fundraising activities to harness funds from corporate and aristocratic donors.
Information about aggregate donations from aristocrats is scarce. However, to motivate our
analysis and to get a wider sense of the importance of corporate giving, we collected evidence from
Forbes’ ‘America’s 200 Largest Charities’ list, as ranked by the value of private donations to them,
published in 2005. The most recent publicly available balance sheets were examined for 199 of the
200 charities included in the list.2 It was possible to collect detailed information on the sources
of funds for 20 of these 199 charities. In particular, the …nancial statements of these 20 charities
allow us to break down sources of funding into the following types: (i) government/not-for-pro…t
organizations; (ii) corporations; (iii) individuals. To understand whether funding sources di¤er by
1In a recent special issue on charitable giving in the Journal of Public Economics, nearly all the papers focussed
on the determinants of why individuals give. Andreoni [2006] discusses the few papers that have studied giving by
the very wealthy.
2The charity ‘World Opportunitites’ was excluded from the analysis as information on this charity is not acces-
sible online.
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the nature of work conducted by the charitable organization, we classify charities as operating in
one of the following sectors: (i) humanitarian relief; (ii) medical; (iii) environment; (iv) arts and
culture; (v) education.3
Table 1 summarizes the data on funding sources by charitable organization type. All three
sources of funding: government, corporate and individual, are important across charitable sectors.
In line with the evidence presented by Andreoni [2006], we see that on average, 30% of all donations
across charitable sectors originate from corporates. The last row shows that government and
individual donations represent 25% and 34% respectively of all donations. In arts and culture
(the charitable sector most relevant to the …eld experiment discussed below), corporate donations
correspond to 20% of all donations, a higher percentage than in other charitable sectors such as
the environment or education. As Column 6 makes clear, corporate donations are more signi…cant
relative to individual donations for charities in the medical and education sectors. While any …gures
based on this selected sample of charities is of course subject to many caveats, they nonetheless
suggest the importance of studying giving behavior of donors other than individuals, that have
been the focus of much of the literature on philanthropy in economics. It is in this direction that
our paper contributes by providing some tentative new evidence from a natural …eld experiment.
More precisely, in conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera in Munich, in June 2006, we
mailed 25,000 recipients—including corporates, aristocrats, and regular opera attendees (whom
we label ‘individuals’)—a letter describing a charitable fundraising project organized by the opera
house. All recipient types in our study are recorded to have previously purchased tickets from the
opera house. Corporates might have purchased tickets for employees or clients. The aristocrats in
our study are all recorded in the opera’s database as having a formal title of some sort, such as
Baron, Baroness, Earl and so forth. In the German context, such aristocratic families are likely
to have a long philanthropic association with the arts.4
Recipients were randomly assigned to mail out treatments that varied in two dimensions: (i)
whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead donor; (ii) how
individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead donor. The …eld experiment sheds
light on how each recipient type responds to the presence of lead donors and the relative price
of giving. We do so for both the extensive margin of giving (whether any positive donation is
made) and the intensive margin (how much is donated conditional on a donation being made).
The behavioral response of individual donors to the …eld experiment is analyzed in more detail
in Huck and Rasul [2011], where we document how sensitive individuals are to the presence of a
3The following assumptions were made regarding donation sources: (i) donations under the heading ‘legacies’ or
‘bequests’ are assumed to come from individuals; (ii) donations falling under the heading ‘gifts in-kind’ or ‘donated
services’ are equally split between individuals and corporations, unless it is clearly stated in the …nancial statements
what their origin is. The classi…cation of charities into sector is based on the core activities performed.
4The titled donors do not include Doctoral or Professorial titles. Of course there might be some individuals with
such titles that choose not to use them and they would be mis-classi…ed as individuals in our study, although this
type of measurement error is not expected to be …rst order and would of course make it harder to detect statistical
di¤erences in the behavior of individuals and aristocrats.
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lead donor and calculate price elasticities of response and in Huck et al. [2015] where we estimate
a structural model of individual giving. Here the main emphasis is on the behavior of the smaller
sample of corporate and aristocratic donors.
We add to two strands of literature, one long-standing and one emerging. We …rst contribute to
the vast literature on the determinants of charitable giving. The bulk of this literature has studied
why individuals give, estimating individual price and income elasticities of giving [Randolph 1995,
Auten et al. 2002, Huck and Rasul 2011], understanding the non-price determinants of giving
[Karlan and List 2007], and the design of fundraising schemes more broadly [Landry et al. 2006].
Much less attention has been given to why certain segments of society, such as aristocrats, give,
although as Andreoni [2006] discusses, a body of non-experimental evidence has emerged on the
non-linear relationship between household wealth and giving.
The second strand of literature to which we contribute studies why corporates give to charitable
causes. Two main explanations have been proposed [Navarro 1988]. The …rst argues that managers
choose the level of charitable donations that maximize the …rm’s pro…ts, as this level of donations
might be positive for a variety of reasons: (i) corporate donations may be used as a form of
advertising or to enhance their reputation [Elfenbeim et al. 2010], thus stimulating demand for
the …rm’s output5; (ii) donations improve the social environment in the local community and may
reduce labor costs: workers may be willing to work for lower wages (or may be less inclined to
shirk) if they live in an area that o¤ers better recreational, cultural, health and sport facilities; (iii)
in the long run, donations to educational/research institutions can increase the supply of quali…ed
labor. If managers choose the pro…t-maximizing level of donations, they should set the marginal
bene…t of donations equal to their marginal cost. In the context of our …eld experiment, we should
then expect corporate donations to be sensitive to variations in the price of giving, and potentially
also sensitive to be presence of lead donors that might signal the quality of the charitable project
[Vesterlund 2003].
An alternative explanation is that managers use corporate donations to maximize their own
utility rather than the …rm’s pro…ts. Corporate donations may give the manager private utility,
either because of the warm glow from the donation act itself or because of the private bene…ts the
manager may get from corporate donations. In our context, donations to the fundraising drive
organized by the opera house might secure the manager good seats at the shows and invitations
to dinners and parties attended by celebrity opera singers. Hence in the presence of such agency
problems within the …rm where managers are not donating their own money, we should expect
relative to individual donations, corporate donations to be less sensitive to changes in the relative
price of giving or the presence of lead donors.
Navarro [1988] and Boatsman and Gupta [1996] use changes in corporate tax rates in the US to
5This holds also if donations are anonymous, as the …rm can still advertise how much money it donates to charity
overall, thus improving its reputation as a socially responsible …rm. This may increase the …rm’s sales among those
customers that value (corporate) charitable giving.
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provide evidence on in tested between the two explanations of corporate giving behavior, although
this evidence remains mixed. Werbel et al. [2002] and Brown et al. [2006] present evidence more
in line with the existence of agency problems within …rms so that managers choose charitable
contributions to maximize their own utility rather than pro…tability.6
Our …eld experiment allows us to explore the sensitivity of corporate and aristocratic giving to
the presence of lead donors, and the relative price of giving. In doing so we enter the debate on why
corporates give by taking an innovative approach: rather than focusing on changes in corporate
tax rates, we exploit experimental variation in the match rates and the presence of a lead donor
within the same fundraising drive. The presence of a lead donor may be interpreted as a signal
of good project quality, thus a¤ecting the perceived marginal bene…t of donations; at the same
time, introducing di¤erent match rates creates variation in the price of giving. If corporate giving
behavior is found to be sensitive to the presence of a lead donor or to match rates in the same
manner as individual giving this is suggestive of managers not biasing corporate giving decisions
for private bene…ts, but rather behaving more in line with choosing the pro…t-maximizing level
of donations. On the other hand, if corporate donations do not react to these treatments, this is
more indicative of agency problems within the …rm, whereby managers use the …rm’s resources in
the form of corporate donations, to gain purely private bene…ts.
Of course the primary challenge faced by any study of the behavior of such a speci…c type of
donors—such as corporates or aristocrats—is that sample sizes are inevitably small and precise
causal impacts hard to measure. This study is not exempt from these concerns. Throughout
we try to be clear on what can be inferred from our …ndings and what needs further study.
However overall our results indicate that the use of …eld experiments—that are now widely used
to understand charitable giving more broadly—remain a useful tool to answer questions related to
even a small fraction of potential donors such as corporates and aristocrats, especially when such
donor types contribute disproportionately large amounts in aggregate, to charitable causes.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the …eld experiment.
Section 3 presents the main results on the intensive and extensive margins of charitable giving.
Section 4 concludes with a broader discussion on the hurdles to be overcome for future studies
that aim to shed light on the philanthropic behavior of corporates and elites.
2 The Natural Field Experiment
In June 2006 the Bavarian State Opera organized a mail out of 25,000 letters designed to elicit
donations for a social youth project the opera was engaged in, “Stück für Stück”. The mail out
6A related literature studies how corporate donors allocate their charitable expenditures across organizations.
Leclair and Gordon [2000] present evidence that …rms contribute more to charities that are more closely related to
their own activities. Card et al. [2008] show that …rms give more to charities based close to their headquarters,
although this e¤ect disappears once the number of wealthy individuals in the location is controlled for.
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recipients were randomly selected from the opera’s database of customers who had purchased
at least one ticket in the twelve months prior to the mail out. Recipients could correspond to
corporates, aristocratically titled individuals such as Barons and Earls, or to non-titled individuals.
Recipients were randomly assigned to one of four treatments that varied in two dimensions: (i)
whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead donor; (ii) how
individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead donor. The mail-out letters were
identical in all treatments with the exception of one paragraph. The Appendix shows the format
and wording of the mail out. The control treatment (T1) was such that recipients were provided no
information about the existence of a lead donor, and o¤ered no commitment to match individual
donations. The wording of the key paragraph in the letter read as follows,
T1 (Control): This is why I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
This paragraph is manipulated in the other treatments. In the second treatment (T2) recipients
were informed that the project had already garnered a lead gift of 60,000. The corresponding
paragraph read as follows,
T2 (Lead Donor): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He
will support “Stück für Stück” with 60,000. Unfortunately, this is not enough to fund the project
completely which is why I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
The control and lead donor treatments di¤er only in that in the latter recipients are informed of
the presence of a lead donor. There is no o¤er to match donations in any way in either treatment.
Such substantial lead donations might a¤ect the giving behavior of others because they eliminate an
equilibrium in which all donations are zero [Andreoni 1998], they act as a signal of project quality
[Vesterlund 2003], or because of a snob appeal e¤ect that makes individual contributions increase
in the contributions of others [Romano and Yildirim 2001]. These models provide less clear-cut
predictions on how the various types of potential donors we study—individuals, aristocrats and
corporates—might di¤erentially react to such lead gifts. Our discussion above suggests that if
corporates are found to be responsive to the presence of a lead donor, this is in line with managers
choosing the pro…t-maximizing level of corporate donations.
The third class of treatments all provide recipients information on the existence of the lead
donor but vary the relative price of giving in some way. To preserve adequate sample sizes in each
donor type-treatment cell, we bundle together three di¤erent matching treatments. In the …rst,
donations are matched by the anonymous lead donor at a 50% rate (so that giving one Euro would
correspond to the opera receiving 1.50), in the second a 100% rate if o¤ered, and in the third a
100% match rate is o¤ered conditional on the donation being above 50. For the 50% match rate
o¤er, the corresponding paragraph in the mail out letter read as follows,7
7The 100% match rate o¤er was analogously worded. The treatment where the 100% match was conditional
on the donation being at least 50 was explained as follows: “A generous donor who prefers not to be named has
already been enlisted. He will support “Stück für Stück” with up to 60,000 by donating, for each donation above
50 that we receive within the next four weeks, the same amount himself. In light of this unique opportunity I
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T3 (Matching): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will
support “Stück für Stück” with up to 60,000 by donating, for each Euro that we receive within
the next four weeks, another 50 Euro cent. In light of this unique opportunity I would be glad if
you were to support the project with your donation.
The …nal treatment (T4) o¤ered recipients a …xed positive match of 20 for any positive
donation. We refer to this as the ‘income’ treatment because conditional on making any positive
donation it is as if the donor receives a lump sum transfer of 20. This treatment was explained
in the mail out letter as follows,
T4 (Income): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He
will support “Stück für Stück” with up to 60,000 by donating, for each donation that we receive
within the next four weeks regardless of the donation amount, another 20. In light of this unique
opportunity I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
This treatment allows us to bound the share of each recipient type for whom, the marginal
utility of even contributing a small amount is close to zero and are therefore unlikely to donate
under any realistic circumstances given any small transactions costs of donating.
As discussed in Huck and Rasul [2010], four further points are of note. First, the opera had
no fundraising target in mind, nor was any target discussed in the mail out. Funds raised for the
project were used to …nance a series of small events, as made clear in the mail out letter. Hence
recipients know that marginal contributions will make a di¤erence. Second, recipients were told the
matching schemes would be in place for four weeks, with over 95% recipients that donated, doing
so in this time frame. Third, recipients are told the truth—the lead gift was actually provided
and each matching scheme was implemented. The value of matches was capped at 60,000 which
ensured recipients were told the truth even if the campaign was more successful than anticipated.
Finally, the project’s bene…ciaries are children from disadvantaged families whose parents are
almost surely not among the recipients of the mail out. Hence the fundraising campaign relates
to a project that conveys no immediate bene…ts to potential donors, ensuring there is no role for
gift exchange or reciprocity in driving donations, as in Falk [2007]. As donors are not publicly
announced, there is no role for social recognition to drive behavior, that might plausibly di¤er
across the types of donor considered.
3 Results
3.1 Recipient Characteristics
The original mail out was sent to 25,000 recipients on the opera house’s customer database. After
removing missing values and extreme outliers, our working sample is based on mail-outs sent to
would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.”
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22,318 individual recipients, 362 corporates and 53 aristocrats, as shown in Column 1 of Table
2.8 Aristocratic recipients are so called because each has a formal title of some sort. Our sample
includes recipients with the following titles: Baron/Baronin (Freiherr/Freifrau), and Graf/Grä…n—
which is a historical German noble title similar in rank to a count or a British earl. In the German
context, we might expect such elites to have long philanthropic associations with arts and culture.9
The remaining columns provide information on recipients’ opera attendance.10 Individual
recipients purchase around six tickets in the year prior to the mail out in two separate orders. The
average price per ticket is around 87 with the annual total spent on attendance averaging 410.
Clearly, these individuals are not representative of the population. Our analysis therefore sheds
light on how the behavior of elites and corporates di¤ers from such selected individuals. To the
extent that other organizations target charitable projects towards those with high a¢nity to the
organization as well as those who are likely to have high income, the results have external validity
in other settings.
Comparing individual and corporate recipients, Table 2 reveals that: (i) corporates purchase
signi…cantly more tickets, although place the same number of orders over the year prior to the
mail-out; (ii) corporates spend signi…cantly more per ticket. As a result, corporates spend almost
…ve times as much on opera tickets as do individuals. Comparing individuals and aristocrats,
Table 2 reveals there are no observable di¤erences between the two. While aristocrats spend an
average of 10 more per ticket than individuals, this is not a signi…cant di¤erence. Hence at least
in terms of these proxies of a¢nity to the opera, aristocratic recipients do not much di¤er from
individual recipients.
3.2 Who Donates?
Table 3 provides evidence on the observable characteristics of donors and non-donors for each
recipient type. We report the mean and standard error of each characteristic, as well as the -
value on the null hypothesis that the characteristic is the same among donors and non-donors of
the same recipient type. As documented in Huck et al. [2013], the response rate, averaged across
treatments is 4.1% among individual recipients. Comparing individual donors and non-donors,
donors purchase signi…cantly more tickets in the year prior to the mail out, place more separate
orders over the same time period, and are signi…cantly more likely to have last attended the opera
recently. In contrast, the average price per ticket does not di¤er signi…cantly between individual
donors and non-donors. These results suggest that a¢nity to the opera house—as measured by
8We had to exclude some observations due to missing values in the variables used anywhere in the analysis.
We also exclude non-Germans, and individual recipients for which no gender can be assigned. Additionally, we
excluded a small number of observations that were extreme outliers in terms of donations given, de…ned as those
that gave more than four standard deviations more than the mean in the same treatment-recipient type cell.
9On corporates we cannot reveal further information except that 45% are registered in Munich zip codes. In
comparison, 46% (49%) of individual (titled) recipients reside in Munich.
10Given random assignment, there are insigni…cant di¤erences on observables across treatments by recipient type.
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the number of ticket purchases, separate ticket orders, and time of last attendance—is strongly
correlated to the behavior of individuals along the extensive margin of whether to donate or not.
In contrast, characteristics that more closely proxy individual income are less correlated with
whether the individual responds to the mail out.
Comparing across recipient types, we see that although corporates and individuals have similar
response rates to each other, a remarkable 13% of aristocratic recipients donate to the fundrais-
ing project. We know of no other study—even highly targeted campaigns—in which such high
response rates to a charitable fundraising drive have been generated. For corporates, there are
no signi…cant di¤erences on observables between donors and non-donors, except that donors or-
der more tickets than non-donors. Similarly for aristocratic recipients, on observables there are
no signi…cant di¤erences between aristocratic donors and non-donors, except that donors are sig-
ni…cantly more likely to have purchased a ticket recently. Hence, from the perspective of the
charitable organization, the results show that it is relatively easy to predict which individuals
are most likely to respond to fundraising drives—namely those with more a¢nity to the opera
house. However, making similar predictions among corporates and aristocrats is harder, because
unobservables largely drive behavior on the extensive margin of giving.
3.3 Giving Behavior
Table 4 provides evidence on donations given and received by recipient type and treatment. The
donation given relates to amount donated by the donor, and the donation received includes the
value of the match, that is relevant for treatments T3 and T4. Given the small number of aristo-
crats that donate in the sample, we avoid making any claims about the giving behavior of such
recipients beyond what has already been noted on the extensive margin of giving. This is an in-
evitable drawback of trying to study the behavior of a small, albeit important, group of potential
donors. Hence in Table 4 we focus the discussion on comparing individual to corporate donors.
We see that response rates do not signi…cantly di¤er between treatments T1 and T2 while there
is a signi…cant increase from T2 to T3 (which, however, disappears when T2 is compared to the
di¤erent types of matching schemes aggregated here in T3, see Huck and Rasul [2010] for details).
Comparing individual response rates between T2 and T4, we see that a pure income transfer in
T4 induces signi…cantly more individuals to give, as expected.
Column 3 shows that in the control treatment T1, the average donation given by individuals
is 74.2. In the lead donor treatment T2, this rises signi…cantly to 133. The near doubling
of donations given can only be a response to the presence of a lead donor. Combining this with
the previous result on response rates, we note that while such lead donors do not induce new
individual donors to enter, recipients who like the project to begin with like it even more when
they observe that somebody else is already strongly committed to it.
As the relative price of donations received falls moving from treatment T2 to the linear match-
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ing treatments in T3, the average donation received from individuals (including the match) rises
from 133 to 174. As the match rate increases, donations given by individuals fall indicating
some crowding out. Comparing outcomes from the income matching scheme T4 to the lead donor
treatment T2, we see that average donations given fall from 133 to 67.9. Combining this with
the previous result that response rates signi…cantly rise moving from T2 to T4, it becomes ap-
parent that the additional individuals that are induced in T4 relative to T2 are those with low
willingness to pay. This issue is explored further in Huck et al. [2015] that focuses exclusively on
the behavior of individual recipients.
Comparing donations across treatments, we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the donations given.
Hence we can rule out that individual preferences can be characterized by pure warm glow so they
only care about the donation given rather than that actually received, irrespective of the match
rate faced. Similarly we …nd signi…cant di¤erences across treatments in the amounts received by
the project, including the match. Hence we can also rule out that individual recipients are engaged
in pure donation targeting, where individuals choose to give an amount so that the project always
receives the same amount, irrespective of the match rate. In terms of e¤ectiveness, Columns 5
and 6 show the return per mailed letter which highlights again the superiority of the treatment
with a lead donor who makes an unconditional contribution (T2). Of course, if the lead donor
insists on matching, this still beats the baseline without any kind of lead gift.
Comparing across recipient types, we do not …nd systematic di¤erences in the extensive margins
between individual and corporate donors. Column 2 shows that response rates among corporate
recipients do not signi…cantly vary with the exception of a borderline signi…cant fall in reaction to
proportional matching (comparing T2 to T3).
Turning to the intensive margins for corporate donors in Columns 7, 8, 9, and 10, we …rst note
that they give signi…cantly more than individuals in all treatments. While perhaps unsurprising, it
is still an important result for practical purposes. Corporate donors should receive extra attention
from fundraisers if they can be identi…ed as such. Comparing the giving behavior of corporate
donors in T2 and T3, Columns 7 and 8 show that corporates, too, reduce their average donations
once matching kicks in. However, contrary to individuals this reduction is at best borderline
signi…cant (for a one-tailed version of the reported test). Comparing corporate behavior in T2 to
T4 we …nd for corporate donors display much less of a reaction to pure income transfers.
In terms of e¤ectiveness, our two borderline signi…cant …ndings for corporates (a lower response
rate and smaller donations given in response to proportional matching) reinforce each other and
render T2 with an expected donation of 11.70 vastly more e¤ective per letter sent than T3 which
has a meagerly expected donation of 2.05.11
11We refrain from comparisons with the control treatment as there is just one very large donation there.
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4 Conclusions
This note takes some tentative steps to shed light on the charitable giving behavior of two types
of donor that are not much studied but provide disproportionately large amounts to charity in
aggregate: aristocrats and corporates. We present evidence from a natural …eld experiment that
allows us to compare their response to a charitable fundraising project to that of individual donors.
Our analysis of corporate giving is distinguished from previous work that exploits changes in
income or tax rates [Clotfelter 1985, Navarro 1988, Boatsman and Gupta 1996], or that measures
how corporate giving is correlated to …rm characteristics [Brown et al. 2006]. Similarly, our
analysis of giving by elites is distinguished from previous work that has largely been based on
data from tax …lings of the very wealthy [Andreoni 2006].
Our …eld experiment sheds light on how the giving behavior of corporates and aristocrats
responds to the presence of large lead donors, and the relative price of giving. We …nd that
aristocratic donors are signi…cantly more responsive to the same charitable drive than other donor
types and that corporates give signi…cantly larger amounts. Both, are precious for the fundraiser.
Regarding corporate response to the presence of a lead donor and to matching our results are
ambiguous. While point estimates indicate that corporate donations are similarly price elastic
as individual ones the resulting crowding out is only borderline signi…cant. However, coupled
with a reduction in the response rate which also borders on signi…cance we …nd that proportional
matching vastly reduces the e¤ectiveness of the fundraising drive for corporates.
While adverse e¤ects of matching are also present for individuals and have been documented
before in Huck and Rasul [2010] and Huck et al. [2015] the e¤ect we observe for corporates is even
more dramatic and suggests that, even if fundraisers might be forced by competition or indeed
their lead donors to rely on proportional matching schemes, they may want to target corporates
separately. Corporate donors are a valuable source for the fundraiser and may require (and deserve)
special treatment.
Moving forward, an Achilles heel for this type of research question will remain the relatively
small number of corporate and aristocratic donors to any charitable organization, even if these
types of donors contribute a relatively large share of all donations received. For example, since
the Bavarian State Opera started “small money” fundraising through unsolicited letters in 2006
they have raised a little over half a million Euros through such drives. On the other hand, they
earn about 3 million euros per year through large donations from corporates and wealthy donors.
Hence although we see a role for research designs based on experimental methods to establish
causal determinants of giving of di¤erent types of potential donor, we envisage future work might
also encompass the use of qualitative interviews with these types of scarce donor, for example.
Here we focus on aristocrats and corporates as we can identify these two groups from the data
we have. More generally, one might want to study wealthy donors and those that have traditions
of philanthropic activities such as large parts of, say, the “East coast aristocracy”, wealthy “old-
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money” families who have engaged in giving for generations. To that extent, our research into
titled donors also has relevance for countries that have abolished formal aristocratic titles.
Despite the obvious challenges, given the growth in wealth (and giving) of corporates and the
very wealthy, an agenda to explore their motives and decision rules remains worth pursuing, both,
from the fundraiser’s as well as from the economist’s point of view.
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Table 1: Donations by Source and Charitable Sector (Means)
Charitable Sector Overall Donations Government/Not for profitDonations
Corporate
Donations Individual Donations Corporate/Overall Individual/Corporate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Humanitarian Relief 381,167,308 104,957,685 114,321,942 138,399,361 0.30 1.21
Medical 241,932,317 24,942,827 107,157,673 75,325,302 0.44 0.70
Environment 121,666,794 17,274,692 15,171,786 62,369,851 0.12 4.11
Arts and Culture 54,131,539 2,341,136 10,658,940 36,638,668 0.20 3.44
Education 169,352,981 103,188,576 17,775,340 11,628,994 0.10 0.65
All Charitable Sectors 229,982,731 56,890,350 67,852,553 78,233,320 0.30 1.15
Notes: All monetary amounts are measured in US dollars. Data is collected for 199 of the 200 charities listed in Forbes' 2005 "American 200 Largest Charities" list. The charity "World Opportunitites" was excluded
from the analysis as information on the charity is not accessible online. The most recent publicly accessible annual reports and balance sheets were examined for each of the 199 charities included in the analysis. It
was possible to recover detailed information on the sources of funds for 20 of the 199 charities. For all 20 charities it was possible to separately identify the amounts coming from individuals and governments. For 16
of the 20 charities it was possible to identify the amount coming from corporations. For 4 of the 20 charities the amount falling under “corporate donations” includes the sum of corporate donations and donations from
foundations (the balance sheets of those 4 charities do not allow to separate the two sources). The analysis presented in Table 1 is based on the subsample composed by these 20 charities.The sum of the entries in
columns (2) to (4) is less than the corresponding entry in column (1) due to the presence of other donation sources, such as foundations. The following assumptions were made regarding donation sources: (i)
donations falling under the heading "Legacies" or "Bequests" are assumed to come from individuals; (ii) amounts falling under the heading "Gifts In-Kind" or "Donated Services" are equally split between individuals
and corporations, unless it is clearly stated in the financial statements what their origin is. The classification of the 20 charities in the five areas reported above is based on the type of core activities performed by the
charity. The Humanitarian Relief group includes the following charities: Carter Center, Catholic Relief Services, Feeding America, Heifer Intl., Marine Toys for Tots Foundation, Unicef USA. The Medical group includes
the following charities: Arthritis Foundation, Brother's Brother, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, PATH, Project Hope. The Environment group includes the following charities: Conservation International Foundation,
National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defence Council, World Wide Fund. The Arts and Culture group includes the following charities: San Francisco Opera Association, WETA. Charities in the Education
group include: Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Camp Fire USA, Institute of International Education. The complete list of the 200 charities listed in Forbes' 2005 "American 200 Largest Charities" list is available here:
http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/18/largest-charities-ratings_05charities_land.html.
Table 2: Characteristics of Recipient Types
Mean, standard error in parentheses
P-value on test of equality of means with control group in brackets
Recipient Type Number ofIndividuals
Number of Tickets
Bought in Last 12
Months
Number of Ticket
Orders in Last 12
Months
Average Price of
Tickets Bought in
Last 12 Months
Total Value of All
Tickets Bought in
Last 12 Months
Year of Last Ticket
Purchase [2006=1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individuals (control group) 22318 5.86 2.04 86.7 410 .565
(.051) (.013) (.268) (2.93) (.003)
Corporates 362 18.27 1.99 112 1878 .583
(1.70) (.115) (2.40) (177) (.026)
Test of Equality With Control Group [p-value] [.000] [.697] [.000] [.000] [.504]
Titled 53 5.15 1.79 97.1 389 .642
(.670) (.241) (7.48) (43.3) (.066)
Test of Equality With Control Group [p-value] [.291] [.311] [.164] [.633] [.249]
Notes: All figures refer to the mail out recipients in each treatment. The tests of equality are based on an OLS regression allowing for robust standard errors. All monetary amounts are measured in Euros. In Columns 2 to 5
the "last twelve months" refers to the year prior to the mail out from June 2005 to June 2006. Titled recipients includes those with the following titles: Baron/Baronin (Freiherr/Freifrau), and Graf/Gräfin, which is a historical
German noble title similar in rank to a count or a British earl.
Table 3: Characteristics of Donors and Non Donors by Recipient Type
Mean, standard error in parentheses
P-value on test of equality of means with comparison group in brackets
Recipient Type Number ofResponses
Response
Rate
Number of Tickets
Bought in Last 12
Months
Number of
Ticket Orders in
Last 12 Months
Average Price of
Tickets Bought in
Last 12 Months
Total Value of All
Tickets Bought in
Last 12 Months
Year of Last Ticket
Purchase [2006=1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Donors 909 .041 8.11 2.67 87.6 621 .697
(.001) (.301) (.080) (1.40) (24.3) (.016)
Individual Non Donors 5.76 2.01 86.6 401 .560
(.052) (.013) (.274) (2.86) (.003)
[.000] [.000] [.468] [.000] [.000]
Corporate Donors 12 .033 8.92 2.83 118 986 .75
(.009) (2.63) (1.01) (12.9) (277) (.128)
Corporate Non Donors 18.59 1.96 112 1909 .577
(1.76) (.113) (2.43) (184) (.026)
[.687] [.070] [.675] [.580] [.233]
Titled Donors 7 .132 4.14 1.86 88.2 296 1
(.047) (1.27) (.424) (16.4) (58.9) (.074)
Titled Non Donors 5.30 1.78 98.41 404 .587
(.766) (.278) (8.50) (50.2) (.074)
[.967] [.200] [.833] [.833] [.036]
Donors equal to non donors [p-value]
Donors equal to non donors [p-value]
Donors equal to non donors [p-value]
Notes: For individual recipients, the tests of equality are based on an OLS regression allowing for robust standard errors. For corporate and titled recipients, the tests of equality are based on the Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-
sum (Mann-Whitney) test. All monetary amounts are measured in Euros. In Columns 3 to 6 the "last twelve months" refers to the year prior to the mail out from June 2005 to June 2006. Titled recipients includes those with
the following titles: Baron/Baronin (Freiherr/Freifrau), and Graf/Gräfin, which is a historical German noble title similar in rank to a count or a British earl.
Table 4: Outcomes by Treatment and Recipient Type
Mean, standard error in parentheses
P-values on tests of equality of means with comparison group in brackets
Treatmen
t Number Treatment Description
Comparison
Group Individuals Corporates
Donation
Given
Donation
Received
Expected
Donation
Given per
Letter
Expected
Donation
Received per
Letter
Donation
Given
Donation
Received
Expected
Donation Given
per Letter
Expected Donation
Received per Letter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
T1 Control .037 .022 74.2 74.2 2.77 2.77 1000 1000 21.7 21.7
(.003) (.022) (6.27) (6.27) (N/A) (N/A)
T2 Lead donor .035 .064 133 133 4.61 4.61 183 183 11.7 11.7
(.003) (.036) (14.6) (14.6) (44.1) (44.1)
T1 Control [.519] [.320] [.000] [.000] [.180] [.180]
T3 Lead donor + proportional .042 .020 95.4 174 4.00 7.28 103 161 2.05 3.23
matching (.002) (.010) (6.04) (10.8) (34.2) (48.8)
T1 Control [.199] [.940] [.015] [.000] [.157] [.157]
T2 Lead donor [.036] [.104] [.016] [.027] [.150] [.724]
T4 Lead donor + 20 Euros .047 .058 67.9 87.9 3.18 4.11 125 145 7.25 8.41
match for any donation (.003) (.028) (5.47) (5.47) (25) (25)
T1 Control [.040] [.353] [.446] [.102] [.114] [.114]
T2 Lead donor [.007] [.897] [.000] [.004] [.237] [.714]
Response Rates Individuals Corporates
Notes: For individuals, the tests of equality are based on an OLS regression allowing for robust standard errors. For corporates, the tests of equality are based on the Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. All monetary amounts are measured in
Euros.
Appendix: The Mail Out Letter (Translated) 
 
Bayerische Staatsoper 
Staatsintendant 
Max-Joseph-Platz 2, D-80539 München 
www.staatsoper.de 
 
[ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT] 
 
Dear [RECIPIENT], 
 
The Bavarian State Opera House has been investing in the musical education of 
children and youths for several years now as the operatic the art form is in increasing 
danger of disappearing from the cultural memory of future generations. 
 
Enthusiasm for music and opera is awakened in many different ways in our children 
and youth programme, “Erlebnis Oper” [Experience Opera]. In the forthcoming 
season 2006/7 we will enlarge the scope of this programme through a new project 
“Stück für Stück” that specifically invites children from schools in socially 
disadvantaged areas to a playful introduction into the world of opera. Since we have 
extremely limited own funds for this project, the school children will only be able to 
experience the value of opera with the help of private donations. 
 
[This paragraph describes each matching scheme and is experimentally varied as 
described in the main text of the paper]. 
 
As a thank you we will give away a pair of opera tickets for Engelbert Humperdinck’s 
“Konigskinder” on Wednesday, 12 July 2006 in the music director’s box as well as 
fifty CDs signed by Maestro Zubin Mehta among all donors. 
 
You can find all further information in the enclosed material. In case of any questions 
please give our Development team a ring on [phone number]. I would be very pleased 
if we could enable the project “Stück für Stück” through this appeal and, thus, make 
sure that the operatic experience is preserved for younger generations. 
 
With many thanks for your support and best wishes, 
 
 
Sir Peter Jonas, Staatsintendant 
 
 
 
Appendix: The Mail Out Letter (Translated) 
 
“Stück für Stück” 
 
The project “Stück für Stück” has been developed specifically for school children 
from socially disadvantaged areas. Musical education serves many different functions 
in particular for children and youths with difficult backgrounds -- it strengthens social 
competence and own personality, improves children’s willingness to perform, and 
reduces social inequality. Since music education plays a lesser and lesser role in home 
and school education, the Bavarian State Opera has taken it on to contribute to it 
ourselves. The world of opera as a place of fascination is made attainable and 
accessible for young people. 
 
In drama and music workshops, “Stück für Stück” will give insights into the world of 
opera for groups of around 30 children. They will be intensively and creatively 
prepared for a subsequent visit of an opera performance. These workshops encourage 
sensual perception – through ear and eye but also through scenic and physical play 
and intellectual comprehension – all of these are important elements for the 
workshops. How does Orpheus in “Orphee and Eurydice” manage to persuade the 
gods to let him save his wife from the realm of dead? Why does he fail? Why poses 
the opera “Cosi fan tutte” that girls can never be faithful? It is questions like these that 
are investigated on the workshops. 
 
The workshops are also made special through the large number and variety of people 
who are involved in them: musicians, singers, directors, and people from many other 
departments, ranging from costumes and makeup to marketing. The participants in 
each workshop work through an opera’s storyline, and are introduced to the 
production and will meet singers in their costumes as well as musicians. This makes 
the workshops authentic. After the workshops the participants are invited to see the 
actual opera production. 
 
Through your donation the project “Stück für Stück” will be made financially 
viable so that we can charge only a small symbolic fee to the participants. This makes 
it possible to offer our children and youth programme also to children from socially 
disadvantaged backgrounds that can, thus, learn about the fascination of opera. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In German, Stück für Stück is a wordplay --- “Stück” meaning “play” as in 
drama and “Stück für Stück” being an expression for doing something bit by bit. 
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